They also do not occur in developed, modern societies.

In order to take a closer look at the essence of the revolution as an analytical category, I offer a brief overview of the most influential theories of revolution, proposed mainly by Western researchers of the twentieth century.

Theoretical explanations of the revolution

According to J. Goldstone, the phenomenon of revolution was studied in the twentieth century by three generations of researchers. Conditionally, they can be divided into generations of representatives of the "natural history of the revolution" that in the 20’s – 30’s to formulate a fairly comprehensive list of signs of the revolution. Analyzing these features, the first researchers of the phenomenon of revolution were able to quite successfully reconstruct a typical sequence of revolutionary events [17].

These features included the following: the growing role of "intellectuals" who refuse to support the existing regime; before the revolution the government is trying to carry out deep reforms; the fall of the regime begins with an acute political crisis caused by the government’s inability to cope not so much with the actions of the opposition as with political, military, economic or other internal problems; the emergence of conflicts among revolutionaries after the victory of the revolution.

Radicals, conservatives and moderates appear; the first to succeed in coming to power after the victory of the revolution are the moderate revolutionaries; through moderate reforms, they try to restore power, while the radicals organize mass mobilization; changes in the social order and the dominant ideology do not occur when the old regime falls, but when the radicals are attracted by the support of the masses and take the place of the "moderates"; bringing order is by force.

This is usually the beginning of revolutionary "terror"; the struggle between "radicals" and "moderates" as well as between the defenders of the revolution and external enemies contributes to the coming to power of the military (J. Washington, O. Cromwell, Napoleon, K. Ataturk, Mao Zedong, J . Broz Tito); the radical phase of the revolution changes with the new coming to power of pragmatic "moderates" who contribute to the establishment of order in the new conditions (attention is focused on economic rather than political issues).

The next two generations can be considered representatives of general theories of political violence, who wrote their works in the 1960s – 1970s, and representatives of the latest "pluralistic" interpretations of the revolution, whose works appeared in the late 1990s and 1980s [18] …

The most notable in the 1960s and 1970s was the psychological theory of violent forms of social activity proposed by the American researcher J. Davis. To explain the violent actions, the scientist used two concepts – revolution and revolt, although he did not offer a brief definition of these concepts. The only difference between revolution and revolt, in his opinion, is that revolution "covers a larger segment of the population than rebellion."

Analyzing several classical revolutions, the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany in 1933, and the Negro and student riots of the 1960s in the United States, J. Davis proposed an interesting hypothesis. According to J. Davis, a revolution is most likely when a long period of rising expectations and real satisfaction of needs is replaced by a short period of sharp disappointment, during which the gap between expectations and real opportunities to meet needs deepens and becomes unbearable. If dissatisfaction (frustration) is caused by government actions, it can manifest itself in violent actions in the form of riots. If dissatisfaction takes extreme form and spreads to society as a whole, it acquires the signs of a revolution.

The gap between the expected satisfaction and the real ability to meet their needs is in the form of an inverted English letter J. By the characteristic curvature of this letter, J. Davis’s hypothesis became known as the "curve-J". J. Davis’s explanation became an empirically sound alternative to the "natural" explanation of revolutions. J. Davis emphasized that the probability of a social explosion is not greatest when the situation of the general population is constantly deteriorating (which we could observe in Ukraine), but only when their situation has been improving for a long time and has suddenly deteriorated sharply … This observation shows that the demands of the population decrease as the situation worsens.

J. Davis’s hypothesis explains well that there were no significant protests in Ukraine during the entire period of independence, but it does not provide an explanation for the mass, nonviolent mobilization of a large part of the population at the end of 2004.

Sociologists have suggested another explanation for political violence. N. Smelzer, in particular, argued that instead of studying mass discontent, scientists should study social institutions. He stressed that when different subsystems of society change at the same rate, management remains stable. However, when one of the subsystems begins to change independently, an imbalance is formed, which pushes the population to change the value system. When the imbalance between the changes of individual subsystems is exacerbated, then radical ideologies spread, undermining the legitimacy of the existing system. In such periods, war, government crisis or famine can lead to the fall of the government [20].

An attempt to combine psychological and sociological explanations of the revolution was made by S. Huntington, based on the theory of modernization common in the 1970s. He argued that a key aspect of modernization was the requirement to increase political participation. Revolutions, from Huntington’s point of view, do not break out in traditional societies. They also do not occur in developed, modern societies. Revolutions most often occur in societies that have undergone some social and economic development, but in which political development and modernization lags behind the process of social and economic change. The political essence of the revolution is the rapid growth of political consciousness and the mobilization of new groups for political participation at a speed that does not allow existing institutions to meet their demands.

S. Huntington names two conditions of revolution. First, political institutions are unable to ensure the participation of new social groups in politics and new political elites in power. Second: the desire of social groups excluded from politics to participate in it in order to gain certain material or other benefits. One group that feels alienated from power can cause a coup, riot, or uprising, but only a combination of disgruntled groups can lead to revolution. The possibility of a revolution in a modernizing country depends on:

the level of alienation of the urban middle class – intellectuals, professionals, the bourgeoisie; the level of alienation of peasants from political life; level of unification of the urban middle class and peasants not only in the struggle against a common enemy, but also for the victory of nationalism [21].

Psychological and systemic explanations of the revolution were used to try to answer the question of why discontent arose and under what conditions it could lead to the violent overthrow of the regime. The British sociologist Charles Tilly criticized this approach.

Ch. Tilly rejected the explanation of the revolution in terms of modernization, proposing a theory of resource mobilization. He pointed out that dissatisfaction alone cannot lead to a revolution if the dissatisfied population remains disorganized and lacks sufficient resources.

Arguing that discontent and conflict are integral to politics, Tilly stressed that political violence is possible only when disgruntled groups have sufficient resources and organization to carry out their intentions. From this point of view, modernization may cause dissatisfaction, but it does not necessarily lead to revolution.

General theories of revolution were based on psychological explanations of relative deprivation and frustration, taking into account the unevenness of institutional change and mobility.action of resources by contrelites. In the works of the authors in this area there was not only a study of individual dissatisfaction, but also changes in existing institutions and the activities of opposition groups.

However, as noted by J. Goldstone, all general theories of revolution had certain problems, explaining how and where revolutions occur [22].

First, general theories viewed the revolution as a directed movement of the opposition to gain power in the state. They explained them by studying the origins of the opposition and its resources for collective action. However, as practice has shown, revolutions often began not with the activities of a strong opposition, but with the internal collapse of public administration bodies, which proved incapable of performing their functions. General theories did not answer why the collapse of the state occurred and how it was associated with the emergence of revolutions.

Second, in discussing the problem of modernization, Western scholars later realized that modernization was not a common process. It has its own characteristics in each country. Whether modernization leads to revolution and what type of revolution can occur as a result of modernization depends on the relationship between landowners and peasants, between urban and rural populations, and even on the rate of population growth.

These problems have prompted researchers to study the peculiarities of the political, economic and social structure of states and to determine the impact a tree grows in brooklyn book 2 chapters summary of various factors on the stability of states.

Thus appeared the structural theory of revolution proposed by T. Skokpol and E. Trimberger [23]. The structural theory of revolution assumes that states have different structures and therefore experience different influences that can lead to the disintegration of the state. This theory emphasizes that revolutions begin with a combination of various factors, first of all – with the conflict between the state and the elites, the manifestation of civil discontent and competition between states in the international arena.

T. Skokpol drew attention to the fact that states with backward economies are experiencing significant pressure from the international environment, which is manifested in the collapse of state institutions and revolutions. A striking example is Russia during the First World War, France of the XVIII century, which gave way to economically powerful England, as well as Japan, China and Turkey, which fought with Western powers in the XIX and XX centuries.

States can disintegrate without defeat in war. The possibility of internal disintegration depends on the relationship between the state and the ruling political elites. If the state, trying to reduce external pressure, resorts to the traditional sources of income of elites or their political weight, then a conflict between the state and influential political forces becomes inevitable.